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Abstract
The key premise is that the contexts of choice and reasoning are reciprocally adjust-
able, without denying the existence of the gap between the legal decision and the 
indication of the factual and legal reasons. The legal basis requires investigation that 
sheds light on the internal phase of decision making. It is imperative to elucidate, 
with the support of the behavioral and communicational sciences, the conscious and 
unconscious factors that weigh in the legal choices and tend to influence them. The 
decision-making exercise requires the contemporary justification of choice, rather 
than retrofactual grounds, which are intended to confirm previous inclinations without 
overcoming biases. Here, evidence-based justification is advocated to account for the 
entire process of assumption of premises, aware that the rhetorical invocation of argu-
ments of mere confirmation is unreasonable. In fact, a new understanding of the justi-
fication in a legal decision is necessary to avoid common mistakes that can arise from 
the decision-making. Evaluating impacts, considering all the direct and indirect costs 
and benefits of the decision-making, is crucial to carry out the duty of justification.
Keywords: justification, legal decisions, internal phase, evaluating impacts, contexts 
of choice and reasoning.
Resumo
A premissa principal é que os contextos de escolha e de raciocínio são mutuamente 
ajustáveis, sem negar a existência do hiato entre a decisão jurídica e a indicação das 
razões de fato e de direito. A fundamentação jurídica requer uma investigação que 
coloque luz sobre a fase interna de tomada de decisão. É imperativo elucidar, com 
o apoio das ciências comportamentais e comunicacionais, os fatores conscientes e 
inconscientes que pesam nas escolhas jurídicas e tendem a influenciá-las. O exercício 
de tomada de decisão requer a justificativa contemporânea de escolha, em vez de 
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Introduction
The hidden side of the legal decision needs to 
be scientifically enlightened. With this purpose, the de-
cision and justification require an unprecedented joint 
research in order to assess the internal phase of the 
decision-making. In fact, it is imperative to uncover, with 
the support of the behavioral sciences, the cognitive and 
non-cognitive, conscious and unconscious factors that 
impact the legal choices.
Indeed, the exercise of the decision requires a 
justification contemporary to the choice. Therefore, it 
is necessary to have a legal justification that unveils all 
premises, aware that it is not enough to invoke abstract 
and rhetorical arguments in a simply confirming way2.
It is based on the idea that the contexts of 
choice and justification are mutually adjustable3. Cer-
tainly, there is a gap between the decision and the 
indication of legal and factual motives, but what is at-
tempted is to encourage a two-way approach. In other 
words, by justification, the decision can be modulated 
and revised, in the sowing of better systemic results 
(Endicott, 2015, p. 199). In deciding, justifications can 
serve as restraints to inappropriate, stereotyped and 
non-universalizable impulses.
This way, the justification performs noble pur-
poses, among which the one to favor the debiasing 
which enables the impartiality, arouses trust and pre-
dictability, protects legitimate expectations, and projects 
decision effects in time, with the preventive emphasis 
and above myopic formalisms.
Thus, the legal justification removes the deci-
sion-making from the Platonic cave, by making explicit 
the arguments which conduct to the choice of mul-
tidimensional net benefits4. It broadens the controls 
(judicial, social, external and internal), in order to 
scrutinize the decision itself and anticipate the cor-
responding effects.
Justification and choice, from this perspective, 
are encapsulated in a holistic cycle (endo and extrapro-
cedural) of mutual constitution, which key-aim is the 
crossing from the decisionism chaos to the acceptable 
legal order. In other words, the justification cannot be 
isolationist and candidly disattached to the underlying 
motivations. The late justification cannot be isolationist 
and candidly denier of the underlying reasons.
The point is that the justification frequently ap-
pears too late, disregarding the biases (automatic pre-
dispositions) and decisioning noises (inconsistent vari-
abilities) (Kahneman et al., 2016, p. 36-43).
In fact, it is impossible to deny that, in the real 
world, the intuition5 primarily elected the premises. In 
the follow-up, these premises tend to be kept off the 
radar, like if they inhabited a deregulated and zero con-
trol zone. Using this instrument, there is little to do: 
the mere “technical” job to back up the premises with 
enunciation, with simple “ex post” arguments.   
To illustrate, judges animated by opposing pre-
conceptions in capital matters, such as Stephen Breyer 
and Antonin Scalia, tended to fix, in hard cases, com-
pletely antagonistic choices of premises6. Nevertheless, 
the supervenient justification convinced, with easiness, 
the respective sympathizers of the supposed correct-
ness of the options made.
As can be seen, the superficial justification, while 
persuasive to those who are prone to conformity, clari-
motivos retrofactuais, que se destinam a confirmar as inclinações anteriores sem 
superar os vieses. Aqui, a justificativa baseada em evidências é defendida para explicar 
todo o processo de assunção de premissa, consciente de que a invocação retórica 
de argumentos de mera confirmação não é razoável. De fato, é necessário um novo 
entendimento acerca da fundamentação em uma decisão jurídica para evitar erros 
comuns que possam surgir da tomada de decisões. Avaliar os impactos, considerando 
todos os custos e benefícios diretos e indiretos da tomada de decisão, é crucial para 
cumprir o dever de fundamentação.
Palavras-chave: Fundamentação, Decisões jurídicas, Fase interna, Avaliação de im-
pactos, Contextos de escolha e raciocínio.
2 See, about the confirmation bias, Holyoake and Morrison (2012, p. 720). See also Cipriano and Gruca (2015).
3 See, about the contexts of discovery and justification, Reichenbach (1938). See also MacLean (2012).
4 See, in the perspective of the sufficient motivation in the Administrative Law, incorporating the “ex ante” evaluation of impacts, Freitas (2014, Chapter 3).
5 See, about intuitions that come before, and, next, strategic reasons, Haidt (2012).
6 See, to illustrate the axiological mismatches between the cited judges, Stephen Breyer (2011).
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fies almost nothing about the quality, the coherence and 
the righteousness of the premises themselves. In con-
trast, it is defended a justification of other kind, which 
uses tools that permit to transcend the normative lin-
guistic-textual apparatus and enter the domain of pre-
comprehensions.
The sincere decision-maker admits, without 
hesitation, that the cognitive and not cognitive predis-
positions operate as gravitational lines of the decisions, 
subjecting it to the unconscious influx (Libet, 1985, p. 
529-566), most notably when the timely debiasing filter-
ing is not perfected. 
There are pronounced dangers, because the 
most significant moment of the decision-making pro-
cess remains hidden, eclipsed and closed to controls 
and self-controls, due to the excess of deference to the 
inaugural choices, erroneously considered immutable. It 
is no accident that there is a serious misalignment be-
tween original intentions and results7.
It is vital that the justification happens earlier 
to show the boldness of scrutinizing the factors that 
are, at first sight, “strangers” (Danziger et al., 2010). 
From then on, within the limits of the knowable and 
despite the blind spots (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 
2011), it is imperative to operate, with innovative 
parameters, the topical-systematic scrutiny of the 
juridical decision, leaving aside the sterile posterior 
justification, a crepuscular part of the deception and 
self-deception. 
This is the central theme of these reflections, in-
tend to perfect the dialectic process of choice and its 
respective justification.
Hidden side of the legal decision and 
duty of justification: Estimative of 
impacts as source of improvement of 
the election of decisory premises
Illusionisms aside, it is unsustainable the traditional 
project to isolate the plan of the pre-understandings from 
the legal decision. It is also vain the attempt to promote 
detachment between contexts of choice and justification. 
Vain, frustrating, simplifying and mutilating of the reality: it 
encapsulates the false assumption that intelligence would 
judge better without consciousness (as if algorithms, for 
example, could be perfect) (Dormehl, 2014).
Regrettably, this justification model refractory to 
the rediscovery prevails in the legal arena, with all of the 
implications of the bounded rationality8. It insists on the 
rigid separation and, in the extreme, impractical separation 
between discovery and justification9. In such a narrow way, 
decision and justification simply do not dialogue. Practicing 
such a reductionist pattern, the justification has very low 
potential to contain the systematic failures of judgment.
Precisely because of this, it is necessary to con-
struct a robust and realistic hermeneutic dam against 
the eruption of influences10, which are probably incoher-
ent.11 Therefore, with the firm intention of improving, 
structurally and functionally, the legal decision-making, 
it is recommended to institutionalize a previous evalua-
tion of impacts, backed by a comprehensive estimate of 
direct and indirect costs and benefits.
Due to its predictive value, this evaluation has 
the power to reveal hidden motivations12 and stimulate 
7 See, about “outcome bias” and the mismatch between the original intentions and results, Sezer et al. (2016, p. 13-26). It is observed, with righteousness, at page 14: 
“a long stream of research has shown that people consistently overweigh outcome information in their evaluations of decision quality”. It is said, in a precise way, at 
page 25: “Investigating the effects of different modes of evaluation on the outcome bias when the decision maker’s intentions are known, the present research shows 
that joint evaluation can exacerbate this bias. These findings offer a new perspective on the distinction between joint and separate evaluation and the conditions under 
which each improves decision making”.
8 See, about limited rationality, Simon (1959, p. 272): “The classical theory is a theory of a man choosing among fixed and known alternatives, to each of which is attached 
known consequences. But when perception and cognition intervene between the decision-maker and his objective environment, this model no longer proves adequate. 
We need a description of the choice process that recognizes that alternatives are not given but must be sought”. 
9 See, to highlight the problematic characteristic, Anderson (1996).
10 See Sisk et al. (1998, p. 1377-1500). They observe, about this, at page 1500: “Legal concepts, lines of precedent, and doctrinal themes may not be sufficient for unders-
tanding judicial decision making, but they are surely essential. Legal analysis, as a distinct method of human reasoning, cannot be reduced to any methodology borrowed 
from another discipline. The judge brings to bear ‘not only a range of personal and political preferences, but also a specialized cultural competence-his knowledge of 
and experience in ‘the law.’ Backgrounds will vary, attitudes will differ, environments will change, but the law remains the alpha and omega of judicial decision making”.
11 See Sunstein et al. (2001, p. 52-53): “people’s judgments are insistently category-bound. They do not naturally seek coherence across categories. Their assessment 
of problems, taken in isolation, are often different from their judgments about problems, taken in the context of cases from other categories. This is largely because 
any judgment, in isolation, is made against a background of a “natural” comparison set, consisting of problems from the same basic category. Much of the time, 
people will look at problems from other categories only when forced to do so. When a problem from a different category is introduced, the isolated judgment 
is unsettled, and people’s judgments will shift, sometimes quite dramatically. The reason is that the introduction of the new problem alters the set of comparison 
cases, and shifts in judgment are a common consequence of that alteration [...] Coherence is important; it seems to be a minimum requirement of rationality. But 
coherence is not a trumping value, and a system displaying incoherence may well be better than one that is coherent but pervasively unjust. An incoherent system 
in which penalties fit together, but are three times as high, or one-third as high, as they ought to be. Nonetheless, we think that any domain of law should aspire to 
coherence, at least as a presumption, in order to prevent the kinds of arbitrariness and injustice that we have found in both experimental and real-world settings. 
At the very least, efforts should be made to correct the most conspicuous anomalies – a goal that can be obtained without thinking that it is easy or even possible 
for people to agree on what full coherence actually requires”.
12 See, about the most powerful motivation of connection with others, Ariely (2016, p. 101).
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the scrutiny of congruence and temporal consistency. It 
can provide access, at least obliquely, to decision-mak-
ing intimacy13 and reveal not only the omnipresence of 
emotions14, but also cognitive and emotional biases15. It 
brings to light phenomena like asymmetric dominances 
(“decoy effect”)16, intense evocation of the first infor-
mation (“recency effect”)17, polarization18, anchorage 
(Kahneman, 2012, p. 119-128), and so on.
What is advocated is the insertion of controls 
in the decisional materialization antechamber, in other 
words, at the dawn of the election of premises, the stage 
in which “shorcuts”19 of all genres appear. With this, the 
justification must go back to the instants in which the 
domain of conditioning erupts, waiting for the indis-
pensable debiasing (Dickerson, 2016).
Such an inflection is central to the proposed ap-
proach. Deciding is knowing how to choose impacts. It 
is recommended to evaluate the impacts20 as a part of 
justification, except in the decisions of mere expedient 
and self-decipherable  by its simplicity. That means that 
the justification has to be reoriented, from the begin-
ning, to the consequential plane, without any pragmatic 
absolutism that obscures linguistic and systemic argu-
ments in a normative sense21.
It is a preordered strategy in order to clarify the 
scope and elucidate the assumptions of the decision; 
support choices based on empirical evidence; ensure 
that, among suitable alternatives, the final option rests 
on the most topical and systematically advisable; teleo-
logically endorse the measure, with express reference 
to the purposes of the legal system; to establish proper 
correlation of means and ends; achieve the distributive 
justice of charges and facilitate the monitoring (“in iti-
nere”) of intertemporal results.
To illustrate, in the administrative process (ar-
ticle 50, of the Brazilian Law n. 9.784/99), the impact 
assessment, seen as a mandatory component of “ex-
plicit, clear and congruent” motivation, favors scrutiny 
of the axiological antecedents of all judgments that 
affect rights and interests. It unveils, almost with a 
solar clearance, the “inner phase” that precedes, for 
example, the opening of a bidding or a expropriation 
procedure, phase in which the greatest finalistic devia-
tions are observed.
In fact, the behavioral sciences show that pre-
conceptions and mental habits (for good or evil) pre-
side over choices, sometimes with astonishing velocity, 
through the force of intuitions22.
In other words, everything that inhabits the mind, 
before the choice, truly decides. It matters nothing that 
narrative systems23 insist on propagating the reverse. 
Pure elusive movement.
Due to the incorporation of impact assessment, 
however, the legal basis empowers itself to weigh the 
consequences, stimulating the self-control of those who 
decide. Hence the neuralgic aspect of, in due time, unveil 
the fissures of the initial premises and, when necessary, 
eliminate them (Ellenberg, 2014), with open impartiality 
(Sen, 2011, p. 154-183).
Still to illustrate: in the area of  the legal process, 
although it is meritorious to consider the nullity of a 
sentence that does not examine all the arguments “ca-
pable of, in theory, invalidate the conclusion adopted by 
the judge” (Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 489, 
§ 1), as well as vituperate against hollow formulas and 
paraphrases, none of that solves the problem. The fact 
remains that everything that comes before the tradi-
tional justification still out of the traditional scrutiny: the 
real factors of the choice of premises, along with fast 
automatisms24 and lazy rationalities25.
However, a reflexive and debiased legal justifica-
tion supports, first of all, an explanation of the starting 
axiological criteria, rather than pretending that they do 
not exist. Secondly, it detects the fragility of classical ap-
proaches (trapped by the illusion of the incommunica-
ble sequence between choice and justification). Thirdly, 
13 See, about the inevitability of the architecture of choices, Sunstein (2015, p. 420-422).
14 See, in the perspective of not committing the mistake of not ignoring the emotions, Fisher and Shapiro (2005).
15 See, about the cognitive and motivational biases (these last ones influence the judgment considering certain consequences to be or not desired), Montibeller and 
Winterfeldt (2015, p. 1230-1251).
16 See, about asymmetric dominance, Bateman et al. (2008, p. 115-127).
17 See, about this bias, Furnamin (1986, p. 351-357).
18 See, about the hyperpolarization of politics, Pildes (2011, p. 273-333).
19 See, about the process of associations and the ethical employment of “smart shortcuts”, Cialdini (2016, p. 97-223).
20 See, about the understanding of the world as “constructive”, the role of the inferences, and the unconscious mind, the dependence on heuristics and the importance 
of experts, despite all, Nisbett (2015).
21 See, about the legal consequences and the interpretive arguments – linguistic, systemic and teleological-evaluative –, MacCormick (2008, p. 139-189).
22 See, in a different theory, Gigerenzer (2008).
23 See Gazzaniga (2011, p. 938): “Years of research have confirmed that there is a system that builds a narrative in each of us about why we do things we do, even though 
our behaviors are the product of a highly modularized and automatic brain working at several different layers of function”.
24 See, about dangers of automatism and the framing bias, Kern and Chugh (2009).
25 See, about “the lazy controller”, Kahneman (2012, p. 39-49).
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it seeks to change indefensible preconceptions, a “sine 
qua non” condition to inhibit anachronistic, obscurantist 
and self-contradictory choices, which do not fit into any 
logic, even the paraconsistent one (Costa et al., 1999).
In sum, the justified decision demands full vigi-
lance against cognitive and non-cognitive biases, which 
predispose to the denial of the fundamental duty to uni-
versalize the net benefits of each choice. It also requires 
caution to replace negative discriminatory automatisms 
for equal, inclusive and sustainable preconceptions.
In everything that one thinks and believes, Law 
is transformed. Despite the otherness of the normative 
text26, it makes no sense to acknowledge that cogni-
tive biases (such as excessive optimism, Sharot, 2011, 
and aversion to loss, Zamir, 2015) and non-cognitive bi-
ases (such as implicit stereotypes) preponderate, even 
though they do not appear much in the conventional 
justification and against the legitimate proportionality, as 
dreamed by Mark Elliot27.
It is hard to admit: the decision is often made by 
magical arts of occult predispositions, and, only in a sec-
ond moment the rational consciousness of the choice 
made arises, as Benjamin Libet has abundantly shown28.
In this late moment, the control of legality experiences 
remote chances of vetoing the reckless or timorous im-
pulses, injurious to crystalline priorities.
In other words, the rationality applied to the ex-
ternal moment of decision-making has a very modest 
utility to restrain harmful solutions29 and to give effec-
tiveness (positive and negative) to fundamental rights. It 
lends itself to the seal of impulses, falsifications of pref-
erences30 and the placement of speeches that say noth-
ing about fundamental reasons (or absence of them).
On the other hand, thanks to the suggested jus-
tification accompanied by an “ex-ante” evaluation of the 
impact of the legal decision, a promising record of trans-
parency and reflection31 is introduced, leaving the digital 
registry of choice consigned in its earliest records.
Here, however, one must be careful. There are 
ways and ways to operate this assessment. If it is limited 
to economic cost-benefit analysis, it will be a possibil-
ity for specific actions and omissions. It is essential to 
provide social, economic and environmental impacts, 
embracing the non-monetizable values, related to the 
ever-priceless dignity, which is not translated, by defini-
tion, by the cold numbers of economic exchanges.
In this perspective, rational guidelines on predic-
tions, as suggested by Philip Tetlock, represent technical 
contributions32 to overcome the arbitrary distinction 
between the contexts of choice and justification.
In addition, it is important not to fall into the 
psychological traps, accurately listed by John Hammon, 
Raph Keeney and Howard Raiffa, like the one to work 
on the wrong problem; to fail to identify key objectives; 
to sin for not developing the variety of alternatives; to 
neglect the crucial consequences; to think inappropri-
ately about trade-offs;  to disregard crucial consequenc-
es; to disregard uncertainty; to not take into account 
risk tolerance and fail to plan the decisions connected 
in time33.
Of course, by inserting the question on impacts 
within the legal justification, its scope is not reduced. 
Instead, the scope is enriched and extended to put into 
check the inconsequential automatisms that disregard 
preferences and avoid priorities. That is why it is impor-
tant to use the recommended tool.
Entering the inner phase of the decision implies 
the recognition of the (more or less harmonious) co-
existence of automatic and reflexive systems of judg-
ment34. It also implies enacting the end of the account 
of unlimited rationality, a presumption that denies biases 
and heuristics35.
26 See, about the otherness of the normative text, Gadamer (1998, p. 631).
27 See Elliot (2011, p. 253): “(i) Does the measure impinge upon a highly-regarded interest (eg a human right)? (ii) Does the measure pursue a legitimate objective? (iii) 
Is the measure capable of securing that objective? (iv) Is the adoption of the measure necessary in order to secure that objective? (v) Does the measure strike a fair 
balance in the sense that the losses inflicted by it [...] are justified, or outweighed, by the gains which it purchases [...]?”. 
28 See Libet (1999, p. 54): “The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a voluntary act, but rather to control whether the act takes place. We may view 
the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as ‘bubbling up’ in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these initiatives may go forward to an action or 
which ones to veto and abort, with no act appearing”.
29 See, about the tendency to overestimate the consciousness and overestimate the limits, Chugh and Bazerman (2007, p. 1-18).
30 See, about falsification of preferences, Kuran (1997).
31 See, about the distinction between the algorithm mind and the reflexive mind, Stanovitch (2011, p. 29-42).
32 See, about guidelines to the secure prediction, such as thinking in probabilistic terms, Tetlock and Gardner (2015).
33 See, about the main psychological traps, Hammon et al. (1999, p. 185 and ss.).
34 See Stanovich and West (2000, p. 645-726). They observe at page 658: “System 1 is characterized as automatic, largely unconscious, and relatively undemanding of compu-
tational capacity. Thus, it conjoins properties of automaticity and heuristic processing as these constructs have been variously discussed in the literature. These properties 
characterize what Levinson (1995) has termed interactional intelligence – a system composed of the mechanisms that support a Gricean theory of communication that 
relies on intention-attribution. This system has as its goal the ability to model other minds in order to read intention and to make rapid interactional moves based on those 
modeled intentions. System 2 conjoins the various characteristics that have been viewed as typifying controlled processing. System 2 encompasses the processes of analytic 
intelligence that have traditionally been studied by information processing theorists trying to uncover the computational components underlying intelligence”.
35 See, about biases and heuristics, Tversky and Kahneman (1974, p. 1124-1131).
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With support in the empirical evidences, the 
dissimulatory rationalization of implicit associations 
is abandoned and the weight of influences36 is used 
in the decision-making. It pays attention to blind and 
invisible forces, rather than the strict epidermal com-
pliance with the original legal order37, designed to the 
feature of Procrustean bed. It is criticized the bizarre 
assumption that “homo sapiens” (Thaler, 2000, p. 33-
141) would act as the algorithm programmed to apply 
heteronymous norms. Not that algorithms are dis-
posable in process management. The major mistake 
consists in considering it the genesis of decision, to 
consider it inscrutable and to ignore the risks of 
pathological discrimination38.
The legal justification, carried out with the focus 
on consequences, is urged to undertake strong debias-
ing39 and to practice the correction of congruence and 
consistency deficits, rejecting the consolatory task of 
monitoring consummate adverse effects.
In the minds of those who decide (Guthrie et al., 
2001, p. 777-830), it is inevitable the presence of false 
memories and systematic mistakes of monocratic or 
collegiate judgment, linked to volitional and/or cognitive 
weaknesses. It comes across, liking it or not, with the 
mishaps of incommensurability (absence of the common 
denominator between competing legal principles)40.
Therefore, before crystallizing the legal justifica-
tion, it is necessary to filter predispositions, as a manda-
tory provision41. It is essential, in the present century, 
to syndicate in advanced terms, in the light of scientific 
findings on decision-making (Sunstein, 2013, p. 50-74). 
It is not laudable to insist on the easy, incantatory and 
trivial discourse of “true reasons” (of the law, the judge, 
the administrator, or the legislator) to deny cognitive 
and non-cognitive deviations. In most cases, the impuls-
es (“primes”) guide and decide42.
It is imperative, in the face of this observation, 
to justify in a way to enlarge the resistance to the im-
pulsive, arbitrary and not thought decisions, which open 
exceptions when it should not and do not open when it 
should. On the other hand, re-dimensioning the justifi-
cation presupposes checking the motivated attendance 
of constitutional priorities, before even dealing with as-
pects related to adequacy, necessity and proportionality 
in the strict sense.
There is no postulation of justification which 
merely confirms original estimates, or – which is an 
equally gross error – that operates as a pretext. With 
the practical sense, it is prescribed the use of metrics 
that link, model, condition the choices and favor firm ve-
toes to harmful nefarious impulses (Lorenz et al., 2011)
In addition, the “ex ante” impact assessment gen-
erates authentic “feedforward”43, with the unprecedent-
ed widening of horizons (Achen and Bartels, 2016) of 
intersubjective control, especially if it is accompanied by 
complementary instruments, such as threshold tests44 
and cost-effectiveness analyzes.
As a result, syndicability has a more important 
role: it looks into the future, into the prediction, into the 
reflexive containment of impulses and deliberate reduc-
tion of hyperbolic discount. In addition, it scrutinizes the 
specific decisory omission as part of the causal chain of 
intra and intergenerational damages.
Conceived in this way, the legal justification goes 
beyond the fierce opposition between self-restraint and 
protagonism. It determines degrees of variable discre-
tion in each context. It effects pre-decision evaluation 
with diligence and zeal, promoting the choice guided 
by the appropriate appraisal of constitutional priorities, 
rather than the precarious belief that the task of the 
applicator of Law would exist simply to carry the norm 
from the past to the present.
In other words, without denying the coexis-
tence of rationality with intricate webs of feelings45, 
the legal justification, assimilating the insights of the 
behavioral sciences, promotes informed choice about 
the unconscious process. It leaves the perspective that 
the interpreter/applicator would be able to remain 
indifferent to “external justifications” that determine 
the choice of premises, to evoke Jerzy Wroblewski46. 
36 See, about the influence of “defaults”, Johnson and Goldstein (2003, p. 1338-1339).
37 See, in an attempt to overcome the strict and unsustainable originalism, Balkin (2011, p. 277-340).
38 See, about discrimination caused by algorithms, Fishman and Luca (2016, p. 72): “The discrimination caused by algorithms occurs in many ways that we would probably avoid”.
39 See, about debiasing, Morewedge et al. (2015, p. 129-140).
40 See, about the theme of incommensurability and the attempt of solution, Barak (2012, p. 482-484). See, about the proposal of refuting the objection of incommensu-
rability, Klatt and Meister (2015, p. 30-70).
41 See, about how to deal with the main biases, Freitas (2013, 2014).
42 See Kahneman (2012, p. 55-58). See, to illustrate, about the monetary impulses and its individualistic effects, Vohs et al. (2006, p. 1154-1156).
43 See, about “feedforward”, which aims at the future, in place of the feedback which is fixed at the past and it is difficult to assimilate, Goldsmith and Reiter (2008, p. 174). 
44 See, about the threshold test and “cost-effectiveness analysis”, Salgado and Borges (2010, p. 15-16).
45 See, about reason and “feelings,” both defensible tools for specific duties and the importance to open the “black box” of the human brain, Lehrer (2009, p. 243-259). 
46 See, about external justification, concerning to the election of premises, the formulation of Wróblewski (1971, p. 412): “External justification of legal decision tests not 
only the validity of inferences, but also the soundness of premises. The wide scope of external justification is required especially by the paradigmatic judicial decision 
because of the highest standards imposed on it”.
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It refutes, in line with advanced field research47, the 
chimerical pretensions of hiding the intuitive moment 
of the election of premises48.
When the justification proves itself to be capable 
of joining the prolegomena of the decision, it reveals the 
origin of the choices and the respective links. It operates 
as “prospective hindsight”49. It exorcises “villains” such as 
the “narrow framing”, “confirming bias”, “short-term emo-
tion”, and the “overconfidence”50 in relation to the future.
The legal decision maker does not have the 
right to ignore these phenomena. It is about realizing 
the justification of the choices outside the platonic cave 
(Platão, 1965, p. 107) Such justification rejects corrobo-
ration errors (Sunstein, 2009, p. 23- 26) and learns to 
deal with the influences of familiarity (Jacobs et al., 1989, 
p. 326-338); beliefs that precede ideas (Gilbert, 1991); 
the effects of “framing effects”51; the assignments based 
on facial prints (Todorov et al., 2015); heuristic questions 
that replace complex questions52; difficulties in forming 
affective connections with victims53; the precariousness 
of the automatic system in the treatment of ambiguities 
(Kahneman, 2012, p. 110-115); the propensity to judge 
the frequency of events by availability in the evocation 
(Kahneman, 2012, p. 129-136); retrospective perception 
and based on results (Fischhoff, 2003); the fallacies of 
planning54 and lost costs (Kahneman, 2012, p. 345-346); 
the inversions of preferences (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 
1983); the conflicts between the self of memory and 
the self of experience (Kahneman, 2012, p. 408-415) and, 
finally, the tendency to confuse the shadows with the 
real motives, deplorable confusion perpetuated in the 
runaway of the solar unveiling of those who judge.
Without undue exaggeration, the traditional le-
gal justification is strictly inept to stanch the irrational 
character of countless ruinous decisions, for example, 
the US Supreme Court, whose historical balance has 
been problematic, to say the least, as Erwin Chemerin-
sky lucidly warns55.
The decision/justification cannot remain at-
tached to the faulty superficial and “ex tunc” ratio-
nalization, hostage of the belief system, highlighted by 
Douglas North and John Droback56. That is, legal jus-
tification must cut blind spots and route deviations57, 
despite adverse cultural pressure. In fact, the biased 
narratives are almost omnipresent and imply dysfunc-
tional meanings to the legal system, which is why the 
responsible manipulation is imposed: by the fruits, the 
decisory tree is known.
In summary, the legal decision conquers legiti-
macy if and only if it generates long lasting net benefits, 
by means of legal justification58, in a troubled scenario 
of biases and risks59. To justify, it is essential to deal with 
the cognitive and emotional predispositions60 of factious 
interests, adapted to dishonesty61.
Once this point is reached, the linking of justifica-
tion to the quality of results emerges as a guideline that 
crosses the archaic boundaries between deontologists 
and consequentialists, as long as both are imbued with 
producing antidotes against decisions disattached of the 
concrete sense of universalization.
Having that said, it is imperative to have a jus-
tification of another type, enabled to restrain, from 
birth, the bundle of unthought, mechanical and iner-
tial choices. It seems crystalline that the Democratic 
State cannot coexist with arbitrary and capricious 
options, arising from the erratic and rationalized in a 
“ex post” criteria.
Undeniably, a serious contemporary justification 
for the decision is not limited to expose the motives for 
applying the given law. Nothing more improper: by jus-
tifying in this way, the decision-making sphere remains 
indomitable, jungle, opaque and unintelligible.
A legitimate62 (consistent with fundamen-
tal principles), adequate (with a correlation between 
means and ends), necessary (less burdensome between 
valid alternatives) and proportional “stricto sensu” 
47 See Haidt (2012), observing that the intuitions come first and automatically, and the strategic reasoning comes later.
48 See, about the unconscious, Wilson (2002).
49 See, about the “prospective hindsight”, Soll et al. (2015, p. 64-71).
50 See, about such “villains”, Heat and Heath (2013, p. 9-31).
51 See Kahneman (2012, p. 88): “Different ways of presenting the same information often evoke different emotions”.
52 See, about heuristics as consequences of “mental shotgun”, Kahneman (2012, p. 98).
53 See, about the difficulty of forming affective connections with victims, Slovic (2007, p. 79-95).
54 See, about the planning fallacy and how to mitigate it in the external perspective, Kahneman (2012, p. 249-254). 
55 See, about historic mistakes in the North American Supreme Court, Chemerinsky (2014).
56 See Drobak and North (2008, p. 138-139): “[...] the belief systems of judges are part of the hidden aspects of judging. Many judges openly admit the impact their belief 
systems have on their decisions, often in an unconscious and unexplainable way”.
57 See, about deviations and the importance of questioning the emotional temperature, Gino (2013, p. 227).
58 See, about biases and balancing, Boutang and Lara (2016, p. 123-142).
59 See, about how to deal with risks, Gigerenzer (2014). 
60 See, about cognitive and emotional biasement, Frenkel and Stark (2015).
61 See, about brain risks of getting used to dishonesty, Garret et al. (2016, p. 1727-1732).
62 See, about the criteria of legitimacy, in the scrutiny of proportionality, Elliot (2011, p. 252-266).
Freitas | The hidden side of the legal decision and duty of justification
Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito (RECHTD), 9(3):240-249                            247
(acceptable in the net benefits plan, where there are 
uncertainties and risks)63 result from the intentional 
performance of control of the predispositions is es-
sential. The rest is accessory.
Of course, the “ideologies” remain, in a (appar-
ently) irrepressible way, as Paul Ricouer (2011, p. 79) 
imagined. However, it is important to study the complex 
spectrum of preferences and nuances of psychological 
style. Additional argument for an inflection that unmasks 
the false consciousness64 and dissolves the toxicity of 
the particularistic and insidious opinions, usurper of the 
reasoned and epistemically secure judgment.
In parallel, by admitting that the subject and the 
object are reciprocally involved, in rejection of the Car-
tesian model (Ribeiro, 2015, p. 6), it is necessary to make 
the hermeneutic circle virtuous, not the unfolding of 
obscure narratives (MacKillop and Vidmar, 2015). That 
is, it is important to bridge the current gap between 
contexts of choice and justification, as well as between 
impulsive and reflexive systems, avoiding the tedious 
multiplication of inverse controls that are dedicated to 
the parade of motives that claim the least attention and 
neglect the core: the universe shaped of beliefs, moral 
emotions65 and pre-comprehensions.
The “ex post” justification is fragmentary, shal-
low and too fragile. In one word: insufficient. In con-
trast, the proposed model of justification, far from 
betting on the coldness of Dr. Spock, assumes a proba-
bilistic assessment of scenarios and engenders control-
lability66 tilted by the behavioral contributions (Dhami 
et al., 2015).
This is the legal basis that does not go so far as 
to expose, in the same way as the chaplinian running 
machine, efficient justifications of fact and law, since it 
is willing to examine the whole cycle of legal decision, 
using transparent and plausible considerations regarding 
hidden motives and attempted effects. 
In this view, the fulfillment of the duty to offer 
reasons67 causes the resolute abandonment of the for-
mal subsumption, which sabotages wise choices. And it 
goes beyond. It anticipates, throwing the justification 
to the postscenium of the axiological elections. All 
with the unshakable urge to invest in the exercise of 
open rationality that is not identified with the obscure 
“ad hoc” rationalizations.
Conclusions
Of what was explained, it follows especially that:
(a)  The legal justification, contemporaneous with 
the decision, requires an “ex ante” evaluation 
of the impacts of the choice. Otherwise, it can 
be too late.
(b)  Choosing well is knowing how to evaluate 
impacts. It is entirely plausible to think of 
a justification that questions the decision 
itself, unveiling the intimacy of the decision-
making process.
(c)  The later rationalization of the choice of axi-
ological premises is a fragile piece that does 
not lend itself to the effective protection 
against irrational voluntarism, not universaliz-
able by definition.
(d)  The exercise of legal justification, as pro-
posed, by incorporating “insights” and les-
sons of behavioral sciences, brings together 
unprecedented conditions of control and 
self-control of bias, which are present in the 
decision-making process. The rest is... noise.
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